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I. INTRODUCTION 
The central issue in this case is whether Idaho premises liability will be read so narrowly 
as to protect Wal-Mart from its conscious choice to be ignorant of the risks inherent in self-serve 
operating methods which it required. Retailers such as Wal-Mart have a duty to keep their 
premises reasonably safe because the law presumes as the landowner, they have superior 
knowledge and control of the premises. That knowledge must necessarily extend to products and 
operating processes which a retailer purposefully brings onto its premises. In other words, it is 
the premises owner that it is in the best position to assess whether products and/or operating 
processes can create potential hazards because the premises owner is the most knowledgeable 
about store operations, traffic patterns, customer behavior, etc. 
Here, Ms. Brooks contends that the liquid which caused her to fall came from a Rug 
Doctor carpet cleaning machine which spilled or leaked water onto the floor during the 
unsupervised self-serve rental process. In viewing the record most favorably to Ms. Brooks, the 
district court accepted the facts as true and determined that if liquid spilled during the rental 
process then the rental and use of the Rug Doctor machine could create a hazardous condition. 
Given the evidence as to the various ways liquid could spill or leak from a machine, the district 
court determined that because Rug Doctor's rental process anticipated that third parties would be 
in control of the machines, questions of fact existed as to whether it was foreseeable to Rug 
Doctor that a liquid could spill and cause injury. 
Ms. Brooks argues that the district court erred by limiting its findings to Rug Doctor. 
The record is undisputed that the self-serve rental process which placed the machines in the 
control of third persons was required by Wal-Mart as condition of allowing the Rug Doctor 
machines in its store. In fact, the record reflects that the self-service kiosk required by Wal-Mart 
is unique to it. All other retailers have employees involved in the rent and return process which 
means that the machines are inspected upon rental and return. 
In addition to dictating the method of product delivery, Wal-Mart also chose the location 
where the self-serve kiosk would be located within its store. It selected "action alley," one of the 
busiest places in the store. Once the kiosk was installed, Wal-Mart took a hands off management 
approach and employees were not allowed to touch the kiosk or be involved in the rental process. 
In defense of Ms. Brooks' claims, Wal-Mart takes the position that it had no personal 
knowledge of, nor control over, the self-serve rental process. Consequently, Wal-Mart admits 
that it did nothing to assess whether the self-serve rental process that it required could create a 
foreseeable risk of harm to customers and employees within its store. While Wal-Mart claims 
that there was no record or history of any spills occurring in the area where Ms. Brooks fell, 
Wal-Mart does not does not keep records as to where spills occur, when spills occur, or why 
spills occur. Thus, even if spills had occurred and been documented, Wal-Mart would not know 
if the spill was related to the self-serve rental of a Rug Doctor machine because it had no 
"personal knowledge" of the process or how the machines operated. More importantly, Wal-
Mart is really suggesting that it had no duty to guard against the foreseeable risk unless and until 
there was a documented problem or incident. That is contrary to its own policies and procedures 
which require Wal-Mart to be proactive in assessing areas of the stores where potential slip and 
fall accidents may occur. 
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Wal-Mart essentially manufactures the foundation for its argument that it had no actual or 
constructive notice of an otherwise foreseeable risk by choosing to be selectively ignorant as to 
process. This Court should not take the bait and permit a retailer, such as Wal-Mart, to be 
consciously ignorant of foreseeable risks which arise from operating methods that it requires by 
claiming it had no knowledge. To affirm the district court in this case would be poor public 
policy and create bad law as it would reward retailers who fail to inform themselves of 
foreseeable risks, who fail to follow their own procedures, and who fail to document. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Whether Wal-Mart Exercised Reasonable Care is a Question of Fact. 
The parties seem to agree that under Idaho law, a retailer has a duty to exercise 
reasonable, or ordinary, care to keep its premises reasonably safe and that the duty extends to 
dangerous conditions which the landowner knew, or should have known, about. Shea v. Kevic, 
156 Idaho 540, 548, 328 P.3d 520, 528 (Idaho 2014), emphasis added. See also, Respondent's 
Brief, p. 11. While Wal-Mart wants to focus the analysis on whether the spill which caused Ms. 
Brooks to fall was an isolated occurrence, it is important to understand the rationale underlying 
imposition of the duty in the first instance. In Shea, this Court summarized the burden of an 
injured party as follows: 
In summary, the invitee must show actual or constructive 
knowledge on behalf of the landowner to establish a prima facie 
negligence claim regardless of the nature of the condition. The 
distinction between an isolated and continuing condition does not 
eliminate the invitee's burden to establish the landowner's 
knowledge. In some cases it may be easier for the invitee to show 
knowledge when the alleged condition is recurring or continuous, 
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but an allegation of a continuous condition does not extinguish the 
invitee's burden simply because the dangerous condition is 
regularly occurring. The invitee still must show that the landowner 
knew or should have known his operating methods caused or were 
likely to cause a dangerous condition. 
Id at 548-49, 328 P.3d 528-29, emphasis added. 
Here, Wal-Mart argues that it had no knowledge that its required operating method could 
cause a dangerous condition. According to Wal-Mart, that lack of knowledge is based on the 
fact that it had no notice of any spills or problems arising from the rental or use of the Rug 
Doctor machines. While there are legitimate disputes as to the credibility of Wal-Mart's position 
(i.e., Wal-Mart does not track or document where spills occur), Wal-Mart's alleged lack of notice 
is also tied to its lack of "personal knowledge" as to the very process which it required. In other 
words, Wal-Mart admits that it knew nothing about the operating process and, consequently, did 
not discover that the rental and use of the Rug Doctor machine could create a hazardous 
condition while in the control of a third party (renter). Wal-Mart is not exempt from liability on 
this basis because ignorance is not a defense. 
This Court has noted that the true ground of premises liability is grounded in the 
proprietor's superior knowledge of his property. Liability, therefore, is not justified where the 
owner of the land had no knowledge. However, that rationale does not apply if the landowner's 
lack of knowledge is due to a failure by the owner to use ordinary care. See, Mautino v. Sutter 
Hospital Association, 211 Cal. 556, 296 P. 76 (1931); Martin v. Brown, 56 Idaho 379, 382, 54 
P.2d 1157, 1158 (1936); Tommerup v. Albertson's, 101 Idaho 1, 4,607 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Idaho 
1980). 
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Here, Wal-Mart's alleged lack of knowledge, or notice, is the direct result of its failure to 
exercise ordinary care. Wal-Mart made conscious choices to be ignorant of the very operating 
process which it required, to not document where, when and why spills occur, and to ignore 
company policy relative to proactive assessment of risk. 
The following facts are undisputed. Wal-Mart allowed the Rug Doctor kiosk into its 
store on the condition that the rental process be self-service. R. 678. (Vender Agreement Recital 
,r,r 2, 3). No Wal-Mart employees were involved in the rental process to inspect if machines 
leaked and where returned or rented with liquid still present. That meant customers were left to 
their own device in both the rental and return of the machines. R. 682 (Vendor Agreement, ,r 4.0 
Walmart Responsibilities; see also R. 603 (Walker Depo, 55:2-23). 
It is undisputed that customers would return machine without cleaning them. Thus, 
machines would be returned with water still in the buckets or hoses. R. 637-638. (Hinkle Depo, 
40:11-22, 41:17-43). It is undisputed that the machines will leak secondary to normal wear and 
tear, and that includes, for example, leaks from nozzles on the bottom the machine. R. 636 
(Hinkle Depo, 33:3-13). Spencer Hinkle, Rug Doctor's Account Representative, testified that 
water, including just a few drops of residual water, will leak from a machine if it is lifted and 
tilted. 1 R. 650-651 (Hinkle Depo, 92:20-95: 1 ). 
1 Mr. Hinkle's original deposition testimony in this regard is set forth in Appellant's Brief, pp. 7, 8. Wal-
Mart, in its statement of facts, superimposes certain changes which Mr. Hinkle made to his deposition 
testimony. Those changes were submitted after Ms. Brooks submitted her brief in opposition to the 
motions for summary judgment filed by both Rug Doctor and Wal-Mart. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 30(e), the 
deposition is considered both in its original and changed form, as are any reasons for the change, unless a 
motion to suppress the change has been made. Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 417 P.2d 75 (Idaho 
1966). Even though Mr. Hinkle did not provide an explanation for the changed testimony cited by Wal-
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It is undisputed that Wal-Mart has a proactive policy which states that store personnel are 
to assess and anticipate areas where liquids might leak onto the floor and cause a slip and fall 
hazard. The assessment of such areas is to occur before an accident actually occurs. R. 486, 487 
(Walker Depo, 60:9-61:19; 63:17-24, 65:8-15). Wal-Mart admits that it had no personal 
knowledge of the rental process and Wal-Mart's store manager conceded that he "did not know" 
how Wal-Mart could assess whether the Rug Doctor machines posed a slip and fall risk without 
first understanding whether the machines could or would leak during the rental (rent or return) 
process. R. 672-673; see also, R. 489 (Walker Depo, 70:3-16). 
Wal-Mart repeatedly states in its Memorandum that no one from Rug Doctor ever 
advised that the machines leaked and Rug Doctor's knowledge is not imputed to Wal-Mart. Ms. 
Brooks has never contended that Rug Doctor's knowledge is imputed. Rather, Wal-Mart, as the 
premises owner, has a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises safe. Liability is not 
excused where the owner's lack of knowledge is the result of the owner's own failure to exercise 
reasonable care. Ms. Brooks simply argues that Wal-Mart's duty required that it understand the 
risks inherent in the operating process it required. That is not unreasonable. Whether Wal-Mart's 
failure to understand is excused because Rug Doctor did not tell them the conditions under which 
machines could leak water onto the floor, or whether Wal-Mart's ignorance is a breach of its 
duty of care, is for a jury to decide, not the district court as a matter of law. 
Mart, Ms. Brooks did not seek to have the changes suppressed as the original answer still stands and Mr. 
Hinkle's credibility cannot be resolved by the district court in a motion for summary judgment. 
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B. To the Extent Not Already Encompassed within Current Idaho Law, this 
Court Should Address the Separate and Distinct Risks Inherent in Self-Serve 
Operations. 
Wal-Mart argues that "nothing m Idaho law conditions premises liability on what a 
retailer knew or should have known about the operations of a self-service kiosk". Respondent's 
Brief, p. 18. It is true that no Idaho case appears to have wrestled with the issues raised by self-
serve operations such as are present here. While Ms. Brooks would contend that reasonable 
arguments exist which support a finding of liability under current Idaho law, given the 
prevalence of self-serve operations, Idaho should recognize the narrow exception to traditional 
premises liability law found in numerous other jurisdictions. That exception is well defined in 
the State of Washington and addressed by the Washington Supreme Court in Pimentel v. 
Roundup Co., 100 Wn.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888 (Wash. 1983). The required elements have been 
summarized as follows: 
(1) the check-out operation was self-service, (2) it inherently created a 
reasonably foreseeable hazardous condition, and (3) the hazardous 
condition that caused the injury was within the self-service area. 
See, Appellant's Brief, p. 28, citations omitted. 
Wal-Mart's first opposition to this argument rests on whether the issue should have been 
raised before the district court. Wal-Mart suggests that Ms. Brooks should have asked the 
district court to adopt Washington law and is thus precluded from doing so here. It is a well 
settled principle of law that the Idaho Supreme Court is the ultimate authority in fashioning, 
declaring, amending, and discarding rules, principles, and doctrines of precedential law by 
application of which the lower courts will fashion their decisions. This Court has been and 
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remains the final arbiter of Idaho rules of law, both those promulgated and those evolving 
decisionally. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660, (Idaho 1992). Even if raised 
below, the district court would have been constrained to apply the law as set forth by this Court. 
Next, Wal-Mart attempts to distinguish Washington law and the exception afforded. 
However, in doing so, Wal-Mart simply uses selected excerpts without addressing the underlying 
logic and rationale of the Pimentel exception, or the full context and body of the cases to which it 
cites. 
For example, Wal-Mart argues that Ingersoll v. De Bartolo Inc., 869 P.2d 1014 (Wash. 
1994) limits the exception to those areas of self-serve operation where the risk of injury is 
continuous or foreseeably inherent in the nature of the business or mode of operation. Wal-Mart 
then argues that because the self-serve Rug Doctor rental process had a "mere possibility" of 
creating a dangerous condition in the "vicinity" of the operation, application of the Pimentel 
exception would lead to "near strict liability." However, that is clearly not what Ms. Brooks is 
arguing nor would that be a logical application of the self-serve exception. 
The Ingersoll case did not change or otherwise modify the elements of the exception as 
set forth in Pimentel. Indeed, as later noted in Dupuy v. Petsmart, Inc., 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 
912 (Wash. Ct. App. May 3, 2010), the exception did not apply in Ingersoll because the injured 
plaintiff had no evidence linking the hazardous condition which caused her fall to any particular 
method of operation. In fact, the plaintiff in that case could not prove what had caused her to 
fall. Ingersoll, 123 Wn.2d at 654. 
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Here, it is undisputed that Ms. Brooks' slipped on a puddle of water/liquid on the floor. 
Ms. Brooks has put forth admissible evidence that the source of the liquid was related to the self-
service method of renting Rug Doctor machines. The injury occurred at essentially the precise 
location where a customer lifted, tilted and then placed the Rug Doctor machine into the 
shopping cart during the rental process. Consequently, that location, by definition, would be 
within the area of the self-serve method of operation. The district court has already determined 
that questions of fact exist as to whether the hazardous condition was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the operating process. 
Wal-Mart also contends that the case of Tavai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 307 P.3d 811 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2013), in which summary judgment was affirmed for the retailer, is more 
applicable to the facts of this case because the court refused to apply the exception based solely 
on evidence that Wal-Mart sold liquids. However, again, Wal-Mart just uses a sound bite from 
the case and does not address the full analysis of the Court. 
In Tavai, the plaintiff could not establish that the source of the liquid, or that the 
condition which caused her to fall, was related to a self-serve method of operation in the location 
where she fell. Thus, the Tavai court reasoned that the Plaintiffs evidence, and theory of 
recovery, rested merely on the fact that Wal-Mart sold liquids which was an insufficient basis to 
apply the exception. Tavai v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 307 P.3d 811, 816 176 Wn. App. 122, 132 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2013). 
Here, unlike the plaintiff in Tavai, Ms. Brooks has come forth with evidence as to the 
source of the liquid, its location, and how the injury occurred. That evidence reflects that the 
9 
hazardous condition which caused the injury was directly related to the unsupervised self-serve 
rental and occurred in the area of the self-serve operation. Again, the district court has already 
determined that material issues of fact exist as to whether the hazardous condition was 
reasonably foreseeable. 
Wal-Mart's reliance on Connecticut law is similarly unavailing. In Fisher v. Big Y 
Foods, 3 a.3d 919 (Conn. 2010), the Court reversed a denial of directed verdict following a 
favorable jury verdict to a plaintiff who slipped on fruit syrup that leaked from a product in the 
retailers store. Although unclear, it appears that the liquid may have come from a can or product 
that had fallen from a shelf.2 In Fisher, the court noted the mode of operation rule as followed 
in Connecticut: 
[A] plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence upon 
presentation of evidence that the mode of operation of the 
defendant's business gives rise to a foreseeable risk of injury to 
customers and that the plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by 
an accident within the zone of risk. 
Fisher, 3 A.3d at 926. 
The court then noted that the district court did not give the approved jury instruction, 
based on the rule of law above, which required identification of the particular mode of self-
2 The evidence in Fisher reflected that store employees were required to sweep the floors dry four times 
through the day, to inspect each aisle as it was swept, and to document when the sweep was performed on 
a sweep log. A videotape admitted into evidence at trial showed that, seven minutes prior to the plaintiffs 
fall, a store employee passed through the aisle where the fall occurred and a sweep log confirmed that the 
sweep had been performed. Id. at 922. Contrast that policy to Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart does not document 
when or if sweeps occur. While employees are trained to be constantly on alert for spills or other hazards, 
Wal-Mart does not document when or where spills occur, nor, why. R. 482, 484 (Walker Depo, 43: 11-
47: 15; 50:8-11). 
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service operation which allegedly caused the injury. Instead, the district court inserted the words 
"self-service supermarket". The analysis of the Fisher court makes clear that exception to 
traditional rules of notice do not apply simply because a supermarket, for example, operates 
generally in a self-service manner. The error of the district court in that case was the failure to 
recognize that the rule, while applied narrowly, required proof that a particular method of 
operation within a generally self-service supermarket was the mechanism of injury. Id. at 927. 
The law in Connecticut does not appear to be much different, if at all, from the law of 
Washington and the Pimentel exception, a fact noted in Fisher when it commented that the state 
of Washington appeared to have the most developed "mode of operation" rule in the country. 
The Fisher court recognized, consistent with its own rule, that the Washington Supreme Court 
had clearly rejected the notion that the requirement to prove notice was eliminated as a matter of 
law for all self-service establishments. Rather, the Fisher court read the Pimentel decision as 
carving out an exception to the notice requirement where a particular self-service operation of 
the defendant is shown to be such that the existence of unsafe conditions is reasonably 
foreseeable. Fisher, 3 A. 3d at 933, quoting Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wn. 2d 39, 49, 666 
P.2d 888 (1983). 
Wal-Mart argues that Ms. Brooks is urgmg this Court to adopt a rule of law that 
completely eliminates the notice requirement simply because a retail store uses a self-serve 
operation. That is plainly not the case. Ms. Brooks simply contends, consistent with Washington 
law, and Connecticut law for that matter, that if the particular self-serve operation can create 
hazardous conditions which are inherently, or reasonably foreseeable, then the retailer should be 
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charged with notice of the condition or the notice requirement should be eliminated. Where, as 
here, Wal-Mart specifically required the particular method of operation, to the exclusion of the 
traditional way Rug Doctor dispensed its product, and profits from the rental despite incurring 
little or no overhead costs, there is no reason to excuse Wal-Mart's refusal to educate itself about 
the potential hazards. 
Finally, Wal-Mart relies heavily on an argument that the possibility of water leaking from 
a machine is de minimus, or "extremely remote," or "mere possibility." This argument is based 
on a false statistical hypothetical which Wal-Mart creates to suggest that there is only a .00032% 
chance of a machine leaking. The basis for the calculation comes from Mr. Hinkle's testimony 
that he has seen "probably 20" machines leak when pulling them to his vehicle for servicing. 
Wal-Mart used Mr. Hinkle's testimony about the number of stores he visits per week, and the 
approximate number of machines he services, which it then multiplied by some unknown 
number of weeks in a year. 
The lack of foundation for the calculation is readily apparent. Wal-Mart's hypothetical 
does not account for the time that Mr. Hinkle is not present in the store between his service calls. 
He testified that, except for Wal-Mart, his accounts are on 20, 40, 60 or 80 day cycles. R. 632 
(Hinkle Depo, 17:5-23). As for Wal-Mart, he services those accounts approximately every two 
weeks. R. 632-633 (Hinkle Depo, 20: 15-21 :8). In addition, there is no testimony from Mr. 
Hinkle that indicated how many stores he has serviced over the 8 year period. If is unknown if 
he started with 20 account, 50 accounts or 300 accounts in the years prior to his deposition. 
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Accepting Mr. Hinkle's testimony at face value, if a machine was leaking when he 
arrived at a store to service it, then one can infer or presume that the machine still had water in it 
which had not been emptied. In addition, one can presume that the machine was leaking when it 
was returned by a customer, and perhaps, leaking if rented by another customer before Mr. 
Hinkle arrived to service the machine. In fact, if the machine was not in the store or kiosk on the 
day that Mr. Hinkle arrived, it could be anywhere from 14 to 80 days before he might have an 
opportunity to inspect the machine again. If that leaking machine was rented even once, twice, 
or five times, in that 14-80 day period, and it leaked or spilled water onto the floor, Mr. Hinkle 
would have no knowledge of that. 
In addition, if the machine leaked either at a Wal-Mart or another retailer, the spill would 
presumably have been cleaned up by an employee of the retailer. As to the Wal-Mart store on 
Overland, for example, no record would be kept of where the spill was cleaned up nor would 
there be any assessment to determine where the liquid had come from. Mr. Hinkle, obviously, 
would have no knowledge of any spills or leaks that occurred between his twice monthly visits to 
Wal-Mart stores, nor of spills or leaks that occurred between the 20, 40, 60, or 80 day cycles of 
other accounts. 
Finally, if, as Wal-Mart urges, the possibility of a liquid escaping from a machine were so 
de minimus, why would Mr. Hinkle, the person most knowledgeable about the machines and 
their propensity to leak or spill, recommend that floor mats be placed in front of the kiosk: 
Q. At any of the Walmarts where you have accounts --so this can be broader than the 
Treasure Valley--are there floor mats in front of any of those kiosks? 
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A. No. 
Q. Have you ever recommended that a floor mat be in front of a kiosk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when have you recommended that? 
A. What date? Probably a year ago. 
Q. Who did you make that recommendation to? 
A. My boss Eric White. 
Q. And why did you make that recommendation? 
A. Just to avoid any problems in case there ever was water. 
R. 651 (Hinkle Depo, 96:8-21).3 
C. Wal-Mart Was on Constructive Notice of the Actual Spill Because at Least 
Two Employees Should Have Discovered the Liquid. 
In addressing this aspect of Ms. Brooks' opening brief, Wal-Mart contends that Ms. 
Brooks has "failed to present evidence that supports a finding as to the source of the liquid and 
how long the liquid was on the floor prior to the fall." This is consistent with Wal-Mart's factual 
statement in which Wal-Mart contends that the source of the liquid which caused Ms. Brooks to 
fall, and the length of time it was on the floor, is "unknown." That is not what the record shows. 
The fact that a puddle of water, or liquid, was on the floor is undisputed. Ms. Brooks put forth 
admissible evidence as to the source of that liquid, the location of that liquid, and the period of 
3 Mr. Hinkle's recommendation was made after Ms. Brooks fell. However, the recommendation was 
made without knowledge of that incident as Mr. Hinkle was unaware of Ms. Brooks' injury until a few 
weeks before his deposition which was taken on February 5, 2016. R. 634 (Hinkle Depo, 25:11-26:13) 
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time that the liquid was on the floor. Those facts were taken in a light most favorable to Ms. 
Brooks and presumed to be true by the district court which is consistent with the applicable 
standard of review. 
Wal-Mart contends that the surveillance video does not show the presence of liquid, let 
alone the source of the liquid. While it is true that the video does not show the liquid on the floor, 
that is related to the quality of the video and the glare from the flooring. Regardless, the video 
does not lead to an inference that there was no liquid present as it is undisputed that Ms. Brooks 
slipped and fell and the cause of that slip and fall was a puddle of liquid on the floor. Nor does it 
lead to an inference that the source of the liquid is something other than what Ms. Brooks claims 
it to be. That is because Wal-Mart has offered nothing but speculative theory that the liquid 
came from some other source. Ms. Brooks offered the video, the testimony of a Wal-Mart 
employee that the liquid appeared to run towards the Rug Doctor machine (kiosk), the still photo 
overlays which reflect that Ms. Brooks fell in the precise location where the customer lifted the 
Rug Doctor machine into the shopping cart, and the testimony of Spencer Hinkle. See, 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 7, 8, 10, 11. 
Wal-Mart's argument simply underscores the inherently factual nature of the issue. 
Moreover, for purposes of establishing notice of the actual condition, it is mostly irrelevant 
because there was a puddle of water on the floor prior to Ms. Brooks' fall and at least one, if not 
two, employees had the opportunity to observe the spill and either clean it up or warn Ms. 
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Brooks of its presence. The video reflects the actions of each employee and whether or not a 
jury believes that they were being "vigilant," as trained, is a question of fact. 4 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, both in Appellant's Brief, and here, Ms. Brooks respectfully 
submits that the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of the case against 
Defendant/Respondent Wal-Mart should be reversed and the case should be remanded for trial 
on the merits. 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of June, 2017. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
the Firm 
4 Wal-Mart chooses not to respond to Ms. Brook's argument regarding the employee who was 
accompanying her at the time of her accident. As the record reflects, that employee did not observe the 
spill, or if he did, he did not warn Ms. Brooks about the condition. R. 364. (Brooks Depo, 154: 16-19). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~~y of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Stephen R. Thomas 
Mindy M. Willman 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & 
Fields, Chartered 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
~ Email: srt@moffatt.com 
mmw@moffatt.com 
